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Summary  
 
This document provides the results of a scoping study into the role of risk perception in shaping 
climate proofing the Netherlands. The main points are the following. 
What is the problem? 
 Climate change cannot be perceived directly; hence, decision-making on mitigation and 
adaptation has to be informed by reports on detection and attribution of climate-related 
signals. 
 As long as the impacts of climate change do not become manifest in ‘strong signals’, such as 
actual disasters, decision-making will depend on the perceptual capacity to see the significant 
meaning of ‘weak signals’. 
 Interpretation work directed at ‘weak signals’ often involves risk perception; this is an 
interpretation of an event based on one or more dimensions of the risk-frame (which include 
the likelihood of harm and one’s vulnerability to harm). 
 The perception of climate-related risks (floods, droughts, heat stress, diseases) and their 
geographical variation is crucial for developing adaptation policy and for communication about 
collective and individual choices that affect risks. 
 However, continuous changes in the political, economic, scientific and ethical environment of 
decision-making and communication will make it very difficult for all actors to avoid simplifying 
interpretations and misleading perceptions, which may well result in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ 
that hampers climate proofing. 
What aspects of the problem need further research? 
 Against this background, there is a need among the Dutch Hotspots for research into the 
question: What conditions can make risk perception work as a positive and not as a negative 
factor in climate proofing the Netherlands? 
 
Sub-questions Potential knowledge users 
How can policy-makers and practitioners be enabled to 
understand the role of risk perception dimensions in: 
 
- fostering a sense of problem ownership among the 
public and avoiding a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, 
Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water 
Management (and other 
ministries) 
- preventing property devaluation as a result of changing 
location choices by household and firms 
Municipality of Rotterdam, 
Havenbedrijf 
- supporting the design and implementation of building 
precautionary measures 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam) 
- promoting the adoption of appropriate protective 
measures by households and firms, and avoiding non-
protective responses 
Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, water 
boards, municipalities  
- developing novel insurance options Insurance companies, 
municipality of Rotterdam 
- ensuring that residents and employees are well-
prepared to take context-specific actions in case of an 
emergency 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam, Dordrecht) 
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1. Aim and scope 
 
Climate proofing the Netherlands will involve the building of hard infrastructure to reduce risks in the 
proactive and prevention stages of the safety chain and also the use of ‘softer’ measures, such as 
insurance schemes or evacuation plans, in the preparation stage [Kabat, Van Vierssen, Veraart, 
Vellinga & Aerts, 2005]. The organization of these activities requires a participatory approach in which 
strategies are discussed at all administrative levels. This means that, sooner or later, policy-makers, 
professionals, residents and business owners will be confronted with each others’ perceptions of 
climate-related risks. As the recent past has shown, such a confrontation may be a recipe for 
misunderstandings and controversies. 
 
Although there is a core meaning to the concept of ‘risk’, the word means different things in different 
situations. For instance, the policy objective of making the public more aware of climate issues by 
‘increasing risk perception’ can in fact refer to: 
 increasing the perceived likelihood of specific unwanted events, and / or  
 increasing the feeling of personal vulnerability to stressful events.  
 
As these are quite different policy impacts, it is important to consider what the word risk means and 
why it is crucial to take risk dimensions, such as likelihood and feeling of vulnerability, into account. 
 
The role of risk perception in shaping climate proofing the Netherlands is an open issue in the 
Knowledge for Climate programme. Several of the programme’s geographical hotspots that are 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change have indicated to be interested in this topic (e.g. 
Onderzoeksagenda Waterkader Haaglanden and Waterplan Rotterdam). Moreover, a number of 
recent policy documents, such as Versterken waterbewustzijn en waterbewust gedrag, has selected 
risk perception as one of the key research needs in flood safety management [De Bruijn, 2008; 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 
2008]. There is a need for a better understanding of what risk perception is, whether it will help or 
hamper the solution of public policy problems, why that may happen, and what policy makers can do 
to converge their policy with the perceptions of residents and business owners. 
 
The present study addresses the knowledge gaps that need to be filled to support the Knowledge for 
Climate programme and its Hotspots. Specifically, the study aims at the following objectives: 
 To make multidisciplinary knowledge on risk perception accessible to potential users; 
 To make a brief inventory of knowledge demands; 
 To give suggestions for further research. 
 
The study is based on multi-disciplinary, behaviour-oriented background literature, a focus group 
discussion and individual interviews with representatives of agencies connected to the Hotspots. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the relevant background knowledge. Chapter 2 presents an introduction to 
risk perception and the role of frames. Chapter 3 sets out to explain the differences between framing 
climate change and climate proofing. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses how perception can be translated 
into policy. This is the basis for the identification of knowledge gaps and the suggestions for further 
research. 
 
The list of persons who were consulted is provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 contains a short report 
(in Dutch) on the focus group discussion with representatives of the Hotspots. 
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2. Risks, frames and climate change 
 
After a short introduction to the perception of risks, this chapter will explain the background of the risk-
frame and the main risk dimensions. Then it will emphasize that climate change is still very much a 
science-related issue. Because this linkage plays an important role in climate-related discussions 
among scientists and non-scientist, a simple framework is outlined that demonstrates how perceptions 
are being shaped by underlying principles. 
2.1  Risks 
Basically, risks are not directly perceived – what people call ‘risks’ are particular interpretations of 
observed phenomena. These interpretations crucially involve the notions of chance and harm in 
relation to a positively valued object (asset) and a chosen action (see Figure 1). This pattern can be 
revealed by linguistic analysis. When searching for linguistic evidence for the meaning of the English 
word risk
1
, Fillmore and Atkins [1994] found at least five senses for the noun: 
1. Dangerousness, a dangerous situation (‘too much risk attached to it’);  
2. Unpleasant possibility (‘the risk of being killed’);  
3. Someone or something dangerous (to/for) (‘he is a big risk’); 
4. The possibilities against which one can buy insurance (‘to insure against all risks’); and 
5. The chance or hazard of commercial loss (‘there can be no success without risk ’). 
 
Hence, there are various uses of the term. Interestingly, in some of its uses the word risk represents 
something computable. In insurance settings, for example, ‘risk’ seems to have a pre-defined 
meaning about what insurance covers [Hamilton, Adolphs, and Nerlich, 2007]. 
 
In other settings, the various uses of the term risk just share some reference to the notion that the 
future is uncertain, and that among the alternative possible futures that one faces are some that one 
might want to avoid [Filmore and Atkins, 1992]. This interpretation can be found, for example, in 
discussions about when climate change will become ‘dangerous’ for the environment; the latter was 
an important issue at the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [Lowe & 
Lorenzoni, 2007]. 
2.2  The risk-frame and its risk dimensions 
The major uses of the term risk can be explained by a frame-based approach. Theoretically it is 
assumed that people cannot understand the meaning of a word, such as risk, without access to all the 
essential knowledge that relates to this word. This essential knowledge is captured by an underlying 
organizing principle or frame. As Fillmore and Atkins [1992] note, frames can either be created by or 
reflected in the language. A word activates, or evokes, a frame of semantic knowledge relating to the 
specific concept it refers to.  
 
Frames demonstrate that individuals represent many relations conceptually. The risk-frame can be 
seen as a relational structure of abstract story components that involve not only chance and harm but 
also a protagonist, an asset, a choice, an action, a risky situation (see Figure 1). Such a frame 
enables individuals to understand the word's meaning with reference to a structured background of 
experiences, beliefs or practices [Barsalou, 1999]. Once individuals can master the word to a 
culturally acceptable degree, they have an adequate understanding of it. 
 
                                                   
1
 The English word ‘risk,’ the French ‘risque,’ and the Dutch ‘risico’ are derived from the Italian words ‘risco’ or ‘risico’. 
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It should be emphasized that the frame of an abstract term, such as risk, is never experienced directly 
in its entirety. Depending on the circumstances, subsets of frame information (subframes) become 
active to highlight specific risk dimensions. This insight has been one of the most important results of 
research into the perception of technological hazards. The vast literature on this topic [e.g. Sjöberg 
2000; Slovic, 1992; Vlek and Stallen, 1979] has identified a number of (partly overlapping) risk 
dimensions; the most important of which are: 
 the degree to which exposure to the risk is voluntary, 
 the likelihood of harm,  
 one’s vulnerability to harm (or lack of control over harm),  
 the extent of harm a hazard would cause, and  
 the degree to which sources of risk information can be trusted. 
 
 
Figure 1. What people call a ‘risk’ is a relational structure of abstract story components 
(adapted from Fillmore and Atkins,  1992). 
 
 
The value-laden meanings of the different risk dimensions demonstrate that frames are not just 
personal mindsets but mainly cultural structures. Frames are underlying structures of perception, 
knowledge, and behaviour, which are studied by researchers in such varied fields as anthropology, 
linguistics, cognitive psychology, social and organizational psychology, management science, 
sociology, communication and media studies, social movements research, policy science, and 
science studies. One of the reasons why it is often difficult to reveal their role is their ‘hidden’ or 
‘taken-for-granted’ character.  
 
Frames shape in a ‘hidden’ and taken-for-granted way, for example, how a problem is stated, what 
questions appear relevant and what range of answers might be appropriate. A specific example is the 
‘safety chain,’ a set of risk dimensions developed by professionals. The safety chain approach to risk 
and crisis management is based on a crucial distinction between five major stages of a hazard life 
cycle (pro-action, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery). This semantic framework for 
safety engineering practice may characterize a typical professional in this field. 
 
In cases of policy controversies, frames also affect how social actors interact with other actors and 
take shared or opposing positions regarding an issue. Policy controversies arise in the politically 
coloured process of policy design when shifts in the situation, internally or externally generated, 
trigger conflicts of interests rooted in the actors' divergent frames [Schön and Rein, 1994]. 
Accordingly, an analysis of competing frames (or subsets of frame information) may help to make the 
positions of the opponents more transparent and negotiable. Presumably, much about the role of 
frames can be learned from the voluminous work that has been done in the field of science and 
technology controversies [Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Nisbet, 2009]. 
 
In sum, it appears that risk perception can be described as an interpretation of an event based on one 
or more dimensions of the risk-frame. This means that there is room for different interpretations. 
People often underestimate how, for example, risk communication can be hampered by differences in 
the risk dimensions they use (e.g. one person focusing on the likelihood dimension and the other on 
trust). If the frames of two opponents share too little, they will even be unable to communicate.  
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2.3  ‘Dangerous’ climate change 
Although there is no standard methodology to measure frames, they can be better understood by 
analyzing contrasting opinions. In the past decades, studies in many countries have examined 
whether citizens perceive climate change as a risk in the sense of being ‘dangerous for the 
environment’ [Bord, Fisher, & O'Connor, 1998; Kempton, Boster, & Hartley, 1995; Lorenzoni & 
Pidgeon, 2006; Slimak & Dietz, 2006]. These studies revealed that many citizens of the developed 
countries saw global climate change as an issue with potentially serious but geographically and 
psychologically distant consequences. 
 
However, some extreme weather events, such as severe rain- and river-based floods, have had a 
significant impact on risk perceptions in certain regions [De Boer, 2007] Among the citizens of these 
regions, the levels of worry about climate change and natural disaster were relatively high and both 
variables were significantly correlated. The weather events may have contributed to a process in 
which risks that were largely distal were reframed into more proximal risks with consequences that are 
much closer to people's personal lives.  
 
Looking into more detail, dangerousness is not the only frame information that is relevant here. 
Because climate change is still very much a scientific issue, it is one of the policy areas that regularly 
generate debates among scientists and non-scientists. Social scientists who analyzed public 
discussions on science-related issues found that these issues are often linked to a few frames that 
consistently appear across different policy areas [Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Nisbet, 2009]. 
  
For example, synthetic pesticides, such as DDT, have been framed as a blessing for humanity (before 
1962), but also as Pandora's box (after the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962), as a 
matter of specific risks and benefits to be decided on scientific evidence (with the rise of ecotoxicology 
as a science in the 1980s and 1990s), and as a key factor to keep certain industries competitive 
(along with each new pesticide regulation). 
2.4  Framework of perceptual contrasts 
To clarify their meaning, the eight frames identified in the literature can be characterized in terms of 
two perceptual contrasts.  
 
The first contrast involves a promotion or prevention orientation to goal-directed behaviour [Higgins, 
1997; 2000]. Generally, a promotion orientation makes the person sensitive to positive outcomes and 
hits that may be gained through aspirations, accomplishments, and ideals. In contrast, a prevention 
orientation makes the person sensitive to negative outcomes and errors that have to be avoided by 
fulfilling one's moral obligations and responsibilities.  
 
This difference is not just a matter of personal mindsets – the orientations can be associated with 
certain institutions, subcultures within an organization, or occupational groups. Engineers, for 
example, are said to be safety oriented and inclined to ‘overdesign’ for safety [Schein 9-20]. Another 
example is that a prevention-oriented attitude towards nature may clarify the way in which citizens of 
Western countries nowadays talk about ‘nature knows best’ or ‘nature needs a little help’ [De Boer, 
2009]. 
 
The second contrast involves taking a distal or proximal view on an object. A distal view may evoke 
broad categories to represent general features of the object rather than its more contextual and 
incidental aspects [Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & Sherman, 2007]. This may include more abstract 
moral principles to judge the object. In contrast, a proximal view induces categories that are narrower 
to represent more detailed and contextualized features. A proximal view is also more constrained by 
concrete realities, including how other people do things. The person’s attention may focus on 
important, goal-based aspects, or actively suppress irrelevant aspects [Goldstone and Barsalou, 
1998].  
 
Again, these perceptual differences also have cultural relevance. They are closely related to 
differences between holistic and analytical ways of thinking, each of which may have become more 
useful and more available in one culture than in another. For instance, Easterners tend to engage 
more in holistic perceptual processes whereas Westerners tend to engage more in analytical ones 
[Nisbett, 2003]. 
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Figure 2 combines the two perceptual contrasts and presents four cells that reflect promotion or 
prevention orientations in combination with a distal or a proximal view. Building on that framework, 
Figure 3 captures the different frames that may underlie discussions on science-related issues. In 
addition, each cell provides an example of a matching climate-related issue. 
 
Promotion orientation Prevention orientation
Using broad categories
to represent general features
and 
focusing on 
gaining positive outcomes (hits)
Distal
view
Proximal
view
Using narrow categories
to represent contextualized features
and 
focusing on
avoiding negative outcomes (errors)
Using narrow categories
to represent contextualized features
and 
focusing on
gaining positive outcomes (hits)
Using broad categories
to represent general features
and 
focusing on
avoiding negative outcomes (errors)
 
Figure 2. Two perceptual contrasts combined. 
 
The four cells in Figure 3 illustrate that there are major differences between the ways in which climate-
related issues are being framed. Without going into details, it can be said that Al Gore’s movie, An 
Inconvenient Truth, reflects holistic and moral thinking about climate change, calling for precaution in 
the face of potentially catastrophic impacts.  
 
Promotion orientation Prevention orientation
Social progress frame
defines the issue as improving quality of 
life or harmony with nature
Middle way frame
puts the emphasis on finding a possible 
compromise position between polarized 
views 
> Plan for a tulip-shaped island
Distal
view
Proximal
view
Scientific uncertainty frame
defines the issue as a matter of what is 
known versus unknown
Public accountability frame
defines the issue as responsible use or 
abuse of science in decision-making
> Report Second Deltacommittee 
Economic development frame
defines the issue as investment that 
improves competitiveness
Conflict/strategy frame
defines the issue as a game among elites, 
a battle of personalities or groups
> Climate Proof City
Morality/ethics frame
defines the issue in terms of right or 
wrong; respecting or crossing limits
Pandora’s box frame
defines the issue as a call for precaution in 
face of possible impacts or catastrophe
> Al Gore, An inconvenient truth
 
Figure 3. Science-related frames (adapted from Nisbet 2009) grouped into four perceptual 
contrasts, with examples about climate issues. 
 
In the Netherlands, the report by the second Deltacommittee [2008] takes a more proximal view, 
drawing on the latest scientific insights on plausible upper limits of regional sea level rise (i.e. using 
narrow categories). The report’s publication stimulated a lively discussion on scientific uncertainty. 
Both Al Gore’s movie and the Deltacommittee report demonstrate the characteristics of a prevention 
orientation, which aims to avoid errors in dealing with the earth’s atmosphere. 
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In turn, both prevention-oriented frames contrast with two promotion-oriented frames. Promotion-
oriented frames highlight the possible gains that climate-related issues can entail for society. These 
frames may be linked to the notion of a ‘climate proof city’, such as the city of Rotterdam, which 
emphasizes its competitiveness by advertising its various strengths. A more distal view is reflected by 
the plan for a tulip-shaped island near the Dutch coast, which can be seen as a means of reconciling 
the objectives of land reclamation and coastal management. 
2.5  Relevance of the framework 
It should be emphasized that Figure 3 is meant to improve our understanding of the various ways in 
which climate issues may be framed. The importance of the contrasts is threefold.  
 
Firstly, the contrasting pairs indicate that each frame may be a necessary but certainly not sufficient 
condition for effective decision-making. Prevention may have to be complemented with promotion (or 
vice versa), and the distal view of broad strategic planning needs a more implementation-oriented, 
proximal way of thinking about how measures can be organized. Therefore, there is no reason to 
claim that, independent of the context, a certain frame is better than the others. 
 
Secondly, contrasting frames may be used to support effective decision-making. One of the 
characteristics of frames is that they tend to induce a passive acceptance of the information given 
[Kahneman, 2003]. Because each frame may have its strengths and weaknesses in articulating the 
specifics of a situation, introducing a contrasting frame may open-up decision-making and enables 
people to adapt their ways of reasoning and understanding to novel and complex worlds. 
 
Thirdly, scientists and non-scientists will also use the contrasting pairs to influence decision-making in 
the future. Social actors, such as policy-makers, often try to influence each others’ frame by using 
particular communication symbols (framing devices), such as historical examples from which lessons 
are drawn (e.g. the most dramatic recent disaster), metaphors and visual images (e.g. picture of a 
polar bear). By adopting one of the frames they will try to open certain positions in favour or against 
an issue. Hence, it can be expected that the different frames will continue to shape climate-related 
communication in the years to come. 
2.6  Conclusion 
Risk perception is an interpretation of an event that is based on one or more dimensions of the risk-
frame. There is room for different culturally acceptable interpretations. In addition, some other frames 
may be used in societal debates on climate-related issues. These include a social progress frame, an 
economic competitiveness frame, a moral boundaries frame, and a scientific uncertainty frame. These 
frames will continue to shape climate-related communication in the years to come. 
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3. Reframing distal risks into proximal risks 
 
This chapter will explain that there are crucial differences between the frame that people tend to use 
to understand climate change and the frame that is required for a proper approach to climate proofing. 
The differences are growing in importance, because the coming years will show a continuous process 
of risk communication about climate issues. As described below, what has to happen is that risks with 
a distal character are reframed into more proximal risks. 
 
3.1  An event-like frame 
Although the frame of an abstract issue, such as a concept, an event or a plan, is never experienced 
directly in its entirety, it is feasible to highlight some of the issue’s potentially relevant aspects 
[Barsalou, 1999]. Figure 4 demonstrates that climate change can be framed in an event-like structure 
that combines aspects related to ‘causal attributions’, ‘identifiable places’, ‘time horizon’, and 
additional ‘uncertainties’. Each aspect has links to its relevant states, such as ‘likely’ or ‘unlikely’ in the 
case of causal attribution. Particular combinations of the aspects enable understanding of specific 
patterns of climate change manifestations, such as ‘changes in snow’ (likely attribution, identifiable 
places, short time horizon, low uncertainty) and ‘sea level rise’ (likely attribution, more latent places, 
long time horizon, high uncertainty). As stated before, this is just an example. 
 
climate
change
causal
attribution
likely
unlikely
identifiable
places
time
perspective
uncertainty
about science
uncertainty
about politics
aspect
short
long
latent
existing
high
low
high
low
sea level
rise
changes
in snow
state
state
state
state
state
 
Figure 4. Main characteristics of the climate change manifestations ‘changes in snow’ and ‘sea 
level rise’, represented by an event-like frame (inside the box) that combines various aspects 
of the climate change concept. 
 
Without going into all the details of Figure 4, it should be noted that the figure’s key point in the 
present discussion involves the causal attributions. The other aspects should not be neglected, 
however. As mentioned in Chapter 2, climate change is often seen as a science-based issue and an 
important aspect of such an issue is the link with uncertainty. Both scientists and non-scientists can 
frame climate change in ways that may or may not highlight uncertainties in science. Another point is 
what will happen with uncertainties in politics (shown dashed in Figure 4). Again, this issue will not be 
pursued here. 
3.2  Common cause and common effect models 
Causal attributions reflect frames that create specific relational structures, such as storylines and 
mental models of causal processes. In view of this, it should be emphasized that thought processes 
on manifestations of climate change cannot be used directly in mental models of climate proofing. The 
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reason is that the former refer to common cause models and the latter to common effect models [De 
Boer, 2008]. The nature of this difference is pursued below. 
 
The crucial differences between common cause and common effect models can be demonstrated by 
people’s beliefs about, on the one side, living animals and, on the other side, artefacts. Even 
preschool children assume that living things have vital forces inside them that are responsible for 
growth and activity [Keil, 2006]. In contrast, artefacts are developed to serve a function or a purpose.  
Preschool children, for example, do understand that dogs are different from tables. Dogs and other 
living animals are seen as having an essence that works as a common cause of different dog-like 
phenomena (see Figure 5). Conversely, young children conceive of artefacts in terms of functions. 
The table-like function is the common effect that is produced by the different constituting elements 
from which tables are assembled. 
 
Generally, people assume and prefer a common-cause structure regarding ‘natural’ categories [Ahn 
et al., 2001]. Common-cause models are relatively easy to understand and can flexibly be extended 
or reduced [Kinchin, Hay and Adams, 2000]. In contrast, common-effect models require more 
knowledge about the constituting elements and their mutual relationships. 
 
The common-cause model is not only relevant for purely natural phenomena, but also for people’s 
relationship to the habitable earth. It captures the idea of humans as geographic agents who changed 
the earth from its hypothetical pristine condition [Glacken, 1967]. The common-cause is that human 
activities are threatening the essence of nature; e.g. people are playing with things they barely 
understand, such as the earth’s atmosphere. 
 
The common-cause model may help people to become aware of the many ways in which climate 
change can become manifest, such as by changes at the North pole, in the Alps, in sea level and in 
patterns of rainfall. This understanding (e.g. Figure 4) may to a certain extent be in line with 
established scientific knowledge, such as the ‘joint attribution approach’ [Rosenzweig, 2008], which 
involves a meta-analysis of the physical and biological impacts of anthropogenic climate change.  
 
In contrast, making a country climate proof by adaptation and mitigation measures requires a 
completely different mental model. Climate proofing should be driven by opportunities for 
technological, institutional and societal innovations, rather than purely by fear of the negative effects 
of climate change [Kabat et al., 2005]. In short, climate proofing is a common effect of different 
constituting elements that have to be balanced carefully. The contrast between the two models is 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Essence of
a dog
Barking
Legs
Fur
Mouth
(…)
Fully functioning
table
Floor
Design
Tabletop
Legs
(…)
Model of a living animal Model of an artefact
 
Figure 5. Two mental models: The dog’s essence is a common cause; the functioning table is 
a common effect. 
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Common cause
Climate change
Effect 4
Rainfall
Effect 1
The North pole
Effect 2
The Alps
Effect 3
Sea level
Effect x
On Y
Common effect
Climate-proofing
Measure 4
Adaptation option
Measure 1
Mitigation option
Measure 2
Mitigation option
Measure 3
Adaptation option
Measure x
Mixed option
Framing climate change Framing climate-proofing
 
Figure 6. Two mental models: Climate change is a common cause; climate-proofing is a 
common effect. 
 
The shift from thinking about climate change to thinking about climate proofing will not happen 
automatically. It requires a process of reframing, because, by its very nature, a frame tends to induce 
passive acceptance of the information given. Usually, if an observation does not fit the frame it is the 
observation rather than the frame itself that is being questioned. Hence, an active approach is often 
called for. 
3.3  Active reframing 
Active reframing implies that thinking about climate change at a distal level has to be supplemented 
by thinking at a proximal level. In the past, uncertainty about climate change may have lead people to 
conceptualize it in terms of abstract and distal properties [Wakslak and Trope, 2008]. As more 
information comes available on its concrete manifestations and consequences reframing wil l be 
inevitable. One of the options for active reframing is considering a situation from different perspectives 
to make different aspects of it salient. This process is already going on because increasingly climate-
related data are provided that inform regional and local perspectives. 
 
The psychological difference between distal and proximal levels is a topic of much research today 
[Liberman and Trope, 2008]. A distal view may focus on distant future actions. It is closely related to 
different dimensions of psychological distance, such as distance across time and space, social 
distance and distance in the sense of considering hypothetical assumptions. Conversely, a proximal 
view may include implementation practices. Thinking about the how of an activity relates to steps that 
are psychologically near, such as the detailed and contextualized features of implementation. 
Although this line of research has not yet been applied to climate proofing, some tentative 
expectations can be outlined. 
3.4  Shocks 
Any new information on the prospects of people’s family or work may to a certain degree act as a 
‘shock’ to their current situation [Lee and Mitchell, 1997]. Notably, the shock can be a positive, neutral 
or negative event. Over time, sequences of shocks may occur. Future societal communication about 
the various manifestations and consequences of climate change will include issues that fit into the 
science-related frames mentioned in the previous chapter, such as big plans for climate proofing and 
appealing investments that improve competitiveness, but also moral concerns about crossing limits 
that should not be crossed, and scientific uncertainty about what is known. 
 
Additionally, there will be communication about potential proximal measures, such as measures to 
counteract rising flood risks in certain areas. Whether intended or not, this communication may affect 
many decisions that residents and business owners make about the living and working conditions in 
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these areas. People’s responses will depend on how they construct a personal decision frame with 
which to interpret the implications of the events. 
 
In some cases, people might frame the situation as a binary choice between staying in or moving out 
of the area with rising flood risks. However, there are other frames and decision paths that people can 
take. When they receive new information about their environment, for example, they may reappraise 
the value of investments in their property and reconsider the value of risk-reducing measures or 
insurance. From an economic perspective, this involves balancing the costs and benefits, but the 
balance will depend on how the options are framed.  
3.5  Multilevel processes 
The notion that people may construct a personal frame and take a decision path goes beyond the 
traditional economic view of decision-making. The broader view is that real world decisions depend on 
multilevel processes [e.g. Beach, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 2002; Lee & 
Mitchell, 1994; Liberman et al., 2007; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987]. Although these authors use slightly 
different terms to specify the processes, it can be stated that effective decision-making on climate 
proofing will require the following elements: 
 a distal view to keep an eye at long-term values, such as ‘the why’ of staying in the area with 
rising flood risks, 
 a proximal view to stimulate implementation intentions, such as ‘the how’ of risk-reducing 
strategies, and 
 a ‘bridge-like’ guiding principle that energizes and directs behaviour by linking processes at 
distal and proximal levels. 
 
An example of a bridge-like guiding principle is the responsibility for the tasks associated with home 
ownership or membership of a community that fosters a culture of self-reliance [McGee and Russell, 
2003]. 
  
A culture of self-reliance and the notion of manageable risk may enable people to adapt, adjust, and 
change course direction, if necessary. These are important aspects of resilience. In order to 
communicate the notion of manageable risk, all process levels are relevant. Obviously, without ‘the 
how’ of risk-reducing strategies, people might get overwhelmed by a shock. Alternatively, without 
paying attention to long-term values and a guiding principle, people might just take a single action, 
assuming that this is enough to close the case [Marx et al., 2007]. Such a single action effect is often 
overlooked by policy-makers who want to raise awareness. 
3.6  Broader implications 
In addition to this brief description of active reframing, some broader implications should be 
mentioned.  
 
Reframing does not always start with a shock to the current situation. The process may also start 
unobtrusively. Over time, both the living conditions in a certain area and the residents can change, 
such that elements of the situation no longer fit with the residents’ long-term values and guiding 
principles. Sooner or later, a lack of fit can lead to a growing concern about the prospects of their 
family or work. 
 
Further, given the social and spatial context in which residents and business owners take decisions 
on aspects of living and working, the outcomes will also affect the image of the area. Hence, the 
decisions that the owners make can affect climate proofing both directly (e.g., via the measures taken) 
and indirectly (e.g., by changing the vital image of the environment). 
 
Finally, it may not be the risk-frame as such, but the science-related frames that play the largest role 
in this context (a social progress frame, an economic competitiveness frame, a moral boundaries 
frame, and a scientific uncertainty frame). The impacts of these frames on climate proofing could be 
positive or negative. For instance the economic competitiveness frame may induce worries among 
residents who have reason to fear that rising flood risks will decrease the value of their property.  
 
Alternatively, the economic competitiveness frame might also increase the investment appeal of 
insurance among residents and business owners. There is one study that suggests that people prefer 
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to invest in something that offers them the opportunity to salvage something positive from a potentially 
negative situation [e.g. Connor, 1996], but other explanations are possible. 
3.7  Conclusion 
Climate change may be relatively easy to grasp if it is conceived as a common cause of different 
changes in nature. That is important to raise public awareness of the issue. However, climate proofing 
will involve a different mental model. This model should consider all the measures necessary to 
produce the common effect of a climate-proof country. Such a mental model is far more difficult to 
communicate. Risks with a distal character have to be reframed into more proximal risks. Various 
science-related frames may have positive or negative impacts on this process. 
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4. Translating perception into policy 
 
Although the previous chapters have demonstrated that there is a lot of background knowledge about 
perception, there is still the question how perception can be translated into policy. In particular the key 
role of frames in shaping perception, communication, network interaction and decision-making has to 
be elaborated to make it fit for purpose of climate proofing. The elaboration should be adapted to the 
needs of the Hotspots and the way in which they see their role in the coming years. The present 
chapter addresses the main user needs. 
4.1  Acting on ‘weak signals’ 
In the case of climate change, the role of perception cannot easily be underestimated, because 
decision-making on mitigation and adaptation has to be informed by reports on detection and 
attribution of climate-related signals. As long as the impacts of climate change do not become 
manifest in ‘strong signals’, such as actual disasters, decision-making will depend on the perceptual 
capacity to see the significant meaning of ‘weak signals’. Obviously, this notion is reflected in the 
series of reports produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [e.g. Carter et al., 
2007]. 
 
Interpretation work directed at ‘weak signals’ often involves risk perception [e.g. Kasperson, 1992; 
Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001]. In the previous chapters, it has been argued that risk perception can be 
conceived as an interpretation of an event that is based on one or more dimensions of the risk-frame 
(e.g. voluntariness, the likelihood of harm, one’s vulnerability to harm or control over harm, the extent 
of harm a hazard would cause, one’s trust in sources of risk information). There is room here for 
different culturally acceptable interpretations. This relates to the predefined, computable meaning of 
risk used by scientists and the non-predefined interpretation by non-scientists. 
 
The perception of climate-related risks (floods, droughts, heat stress, diseases) and their geographical 
variation is in particular relevant because the impacts of policy options on climate change adaptation 
appear to be very context specific [Halsnæs et al., 2007]. It is the specific combination of climate 
change and other environmental changes, such as changes in regional land use patterns, that may 
create the most significant impacts for society. Therefore, perceptions are crucial for developing 
adaptation policy and for communication about collective and individual choices that affect risks. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that scientists and non-scientists will also use other frames to influence 
decision-making. The point is that climate change is still very much a scientific issue [Robinson et al., 
2006]. The science-related frames include a social progress frame, an economic competitiveness 
frame, a moral boundaries frame, and a scientific uncertainty frame. These frames will continue to 
shape climate-related communication and decision-making in the years to come. 
 
Hence, acting on ‘weak signals’ will require many interactions and dialogues [e.g. De Boer, Goosen, & 
Huitema, 2003; Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat & Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties, 2008]. Moreover, continuous changes in the political, economic, scientific and 
ethical environment of decision-making will make it very difficult for all actors involved to avoid 
simplifying interpretations and misleading perceptions. This may well result in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ 
that hampers climate proofing. 
4.2  Types of activities affected 
The collective and individual choices that are affected by risk perceptions relate to activities at 
different geographic scales and in different stages of the safety chain. Recent studies provide the 
following information about risk perception impacts at national, regional and local level in the context 
of pro-action, prevention and preparedness. 
 
Data at a country level suggest that risk perception (% of the population agreeing that climate change 
is ‘dangerous’) is correlated with the priority that is given to climate change issues in national policy-
making [Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008]. Different kinds of democratic channels also mattered a 
great deal in how the perceptions affected policy. These results are in line with the notion that public 
participation may foster a shared sense of ownership of the problem if it is well-framed [Few, Brown, & 
Tompkins, 2007; McGee & Russell, 2003]. 
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At the level of a regional housing market, the international literature indicates that flood risk 
perception, informed by flood zone designation and insurance premiums, might affect location choices 
and property values. However, these impacts are not observed easily, for example, because living 
near the coast can also be attractive. Hence, sales price differentials may only be revealed after 
controlling for amenities [Bin, Kruse, and Landry, 2008]. Nevertheless, news on rising flood risks 
might induce worries among residents or business owners about the decreasing value of their 
property. 
 
Awareness of physical vulnerabilities to hazards is an important dimension of risk perception. 
Dependent on their location, residents may frame climate change in a way that articulates its 
associations with sea-level rise and/or rain- and river-based problems [De Boer, 2007]. However, 
comparatively little research has been conducted on the influence of people’s location and proximity 
on perception of risk [Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008]. In the Netherlands, there are some 
reports on citizen opinion surveys in various parts of the country, which give information about risk-
related opinions of the residents in these areas [B&A Groep, 2006; TNS Nipo, 2006; 2007]. However, 
this work is not embedded in the scientific literature. 
 
At the regional and local level, risk perceptions are also relevant for the adoption of building 
precautionary measures, such as elevated building configuration or flood adapted use [Kreiblich et al., 
2005]. This can be an important way of motivating residents in flood-prone areas to take their share in 
damage prevention. For example, in the context of the 2002 flood at the river Elbe and its tributaries,  
damage ratio for contents was reduced by 48% due to flood adapted use and by 53% due to flood 
adapted interior fitting. 
 
Generally, risk perception is related to the adoption of various kinds of protective behaviour that can 
prevent negative consequences of a hazard [Brewer et al., 2007; Miceli, Sotgiu, & Settanni, 2008]. 
However, the actual role of risk perception in shaping health behaviour is an undecided issue. In 
particular, there is no agreement in the literature about the relevant dimensions of the risk-frame, 
which may involve likelihood judgments, sense of vulnerability, or extent of harm a hazard would 
cause. 
 
One or more dimensions of the risk-frame also affect the willingness to pay for insurances against 
damage caused by floods. This is a new topic in the Netherlands. The adoption of insurance options 
is complicated by various other factors, such as private investments in damage mitigation measures, 
residents’ expectancies about compensation of flood damage by the government, and the design of 
insurance schemes [Botzen, Aerts, and van den Bergh, 2008]. 
 
In the preparation stage of the safety chain, simply influencing risk perception may be insufficient to 
cause residents to behave appropriately [Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006; Terpstra and Gutteling 
2008]. Additionally, risk communication should address issues of context-dependent action, including 
the possibility, effectiveness and costs of private precautionary measures. Moreover, this 
communication should avoid elements that produce non-protective responses. 
 
Although many issues deserve further empirical research, these studies demonstrate that risk 
perception can affect collective and individual choices that are extremely relevant for policy-making. 
Hence, more knowledge on these potential impacts may help discover how risk perception can work 
as a positive and not as a negative factor in climate proofing the Netherlands. 
4.3  User needs 
Our focus group discussion with Hotspot representatives revealed that policymakers and practitioners 
are in particular worried about the potential negative impacts of communication failures on climate 
proofing in relation to floods (see Appendix 2). There is a general lack of knowledge and confidence 
about the way in which positive communication results can be achieved, such as fostering a shared 
sense of ownership of the problem and effectively communicating the notion of manageable risk. 
 
Based on the focus group discussion and the recent literature a set of user needs has been identified. 
The main question to be addressed is:  
What conditions can make risk perception work as a positive and not as a negative factor in 
climate proofing the Netherlands? 
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Research into this question should enable policy-makers and professionals to understand the role of 
risk perception dimensions in their work. This can be achieved by developing methods that Hotspots 
can apply to recognize the frames that underlie the ways in which policymakers, practitioners (e.g. 
journalists), residents and business owners perceive climate proofing and its background.  
 
The link with practical tools has been elaborated in a number of sub-questions. The next scheme 
gives an overview of the sub-questions, the potential knowledge users, and the state of present 
knowledge of the topic. 
 
Sub-question Potential knowledge user Present knowledge 
How can policy-makers and 
professionals be enabled to 
understand the role of risk 
perception dimensions in: 
  
- fostering a sense of 
problem ownership 
among the public and 
avoiding a ‘dialogue of 
the deaf’, 
Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water 
Management (and other 
ministries) 
Some studies have been 
done in other fields 
- preventing property 
devaluation as a result of 
changing location choices 
by household and firms 
Municipality of Rotterdam, 
Havenbedrijf 
Limited knowledge 
- supporting the design and 
implementation of 
building precautionary 
measures 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam) 
Limited knowledge 
- promoting the adoption of 
appropriate protective 
measures by households 
and firms, and avoiding 
non-protective responses 
Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, water 
boards, municipalities  
Several studies have been 
done in other fields, but there 
are undecided issues 
- developing novel 
insurance options 
Insurance companies, 
municipality of Rotterdam 
Some pioneering work 
(Botzen, Aerts, and van den 
Bergh)] 
- ensuring that residents 
and employees are well-
prepared to take context-
specific actions in case of 
an emergency 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam, Dordrecht) 
Some pioneering work 
(Terpstra and Gutteling 555-
65)] 
 
Each of these sub-questions can be linked to research into broader themes. For example, risk 
perception can be put in the context of economic welfare theory to determine the potential impact of 
the risk dimensions on the estimated monetary value of safety measures.  
 
Another topic is the relationship between risk perception and the way in which the members of a 
policy network try to shape the outcomes of policy design and implementation. Risk perception may 
also raise ethical issues, for instance, about the way in which society should put weight on the various 
risk dimensions. However, research into these topics goes beyond the needs of the Hotspots at the 
moment. 
  
 KfC 013/10  
26 
 
On the relationship between risk perception and climate proofing  
 27 
5. References 
 
Ahn, W.K., C. Kalish, S.A .Gelman, D.L. Medin, C. Luhmann, S. Atran, et al. (2001). Why essences 
are essential in the psychology of concepts. Cognition, 82, 59-69.  
 
B&A Groep (2006). Behoefteonderzoek risicocommunicatie Rijnmond. De Haag: B&A Groep in 
opdracht van DCMR Milieudienst Rijnmond en de Veiligheidsregio Rotterdam-Rijnmond.  
 
Barsalou, L.W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-660.  
Beach, L. R. (1990). Image theory: Decision making in personal and organizational contexts. London: 
Wiley.  
 
Bin, O., J.B. Kruse, & C.E. Landry (2008). Flood hazards, insurance rates, and amenities: Evidence 
from the coastal housing market. Journal of Risk & Insurance, 75, 63-82.  
 
Bord, R.J., A. Fisher & R.E. O'Connor (1998). Public perceptions of global warming: United States 
and international perspectives. Climate Research, 11, 75-84.  
 
Botzen, W.J.W., J.C.J.H. Aerts & J.C.J.M. van den Bergh (2008). Willingness of homeowners to 
mitigate climate risk using insurance. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Institute for 
Environmental Studies, working manuscript.  
 
Brewer, N.T., G.B. Chapman, F.X. Gibbons, M. Gerrard, K.D. McCaul, & N.D. Weinstein (2007). 
Meta-analysis of the relationship between risk perception and health behavior: The example of 
vaccination. Health Psychology, 26, 136-145.  
 
Brody, S.D., S. Zahran, A. Vedlitz, & H. Grover (2008). Examining the relationship between physical 
vulnerability and public perceptions of global climate change in the United States. Environment and 
Behavior, 40, 72-95.  
 
Carter, T.R., R.N. Jones, X. Lu, S. Bhadwal, C. Conde, L.O. Mearns, et al. (2007). New assessment 
methods and the characterisation of future conditions. In Parry, M.L,. O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, 
P.J. van der Linden, & C.E. Hanson (Eds.), Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 133-171). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Carver, C.S. & M.F. Scheier (1998). On the self-regulation of behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Carver, C.S. & M.F. Scheier (2002). Control processes and self-organization as complementary 
principles underlying behaviour. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 304-315.  
 
Connor, R.A. (1996). More than risk reduction: The investment appeal of insurance. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 17, 39-54. 
  
De Boer, J. (2007). Framing climate change and spatial planning: How risk communication can be 
improved. Water Science & Technology, 56, 71-78.  
 
De Boer, J. (2008). Framing climate change and climate-proofing: From awareness to action. In A. 
Carvalho (Ed.), Communicating climate change: Discourses, mediations and perceptions (pp. 158-
169). Braga: E-book. Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade, Universidade do Minho, 
http://www.lasics.uminho.pt/ojs/index.php/climate_change.  
 
De Boer, J. (2009). The role of prevention-oriented attitudes towards nature in people's judgment of 
new applications of genomics techniques in soil ecology. Public Understanding of Science, 
doi:10.1177/0963662509342473.  
 
 KfC 013/10  
28 
De Boer, J., H. Goosen, & D. Huitema (2003). Bewust werken aan waterbewustzijn. Studie naar de rol 
en relevantie van het begrip waterbewustzijn voor het waterbeleid. Amsterdam: Instituut voor 
Milieuvraagstukken, rapport E-03/09.  
 
De Bruijn, K. (2008). Inventory and analysis of European research needs on flood risk management. 
Lelystad, The Netherlands: ERA NET CRUE project. Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management.  
 
Deltacommissie (2008). Samen werken met water: een land dat leeft, bouwt aan zijn toekomst; 
bevindingen van de Deltacommissie 2008. Rotterdam: Deltacommissie, eindrapport.  
 
Few, R., K. Brown, & E.L. Tompkins (2007). Public participation and climate change adaptation: 
Avoiding the illusion of inclusion. Climate Policy, 7, 46-59.  
 
Fillmore, C.F. & B.T. Atkins (1992). Toward a frame-based lexicon: The semantics of RISK and its 
neighbors. In A. Lehrer & E. F. Kittay (Eds.), Frames, fields, and contrasts: New essays in semantic 
and lexical organization (pp. 75-102). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
  
Fillmore, C.F. & B.T. Atkins (1994). Starting where the dictionaries stop: The challenge of corpus 
lexicography. In B.T. Atkins & A. Zampolli (Eds.), Computational approaches to the lexicon (pp. 349-
392). New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Gamson, W.A. & A. Modigliani (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A 
constructionist approach. American Journal of Sociology, 95, 1-37.  
 
Glacken, C.J. (1967). Traces on the Rhodian shore; nature and culture in western thought from 
ancient times to the end of the 18th century. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
 
Goldstone, R.L. & L.W. Barsalou (1998). Reuniting perception and conception. Cognition, 65, 231-
262.  
 
Grothmann, T. & Reusswig, F. (2006). People at risk of flooding: Why some residents take 
precautionary action while others do not. Natural Hazards, 38, 101-120.  
 
Halsnæs, K., P. Shukla, D. Ahuja, G. Akumu, R. Beale, J. Edmonds et al. (2007). Framing issues. In 
B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, & L.A. Meyer (Eds.), Climate change 2007: Mitigation. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (pp. 117-167). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hamilton, C., S. Adolphs & B. Nerlich (2007). The meanings of 'risk': A view from corpus linguistics. 
Discourse & Society, 18, 163-181.  
 
Higgins, E.T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52, 1280-1300.  
 
Higgins, E.T. (2000). Making a good decision: value from fit. American Psychologist, 55, 1217-1230.  
 
Kabat, P., W. van Vierssen, J. Veraart, P. Vellinga, & J. Aerts (2005). Climate proofing the 
Netherlands. Nature, 438, 283-284.  
 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice - Mapping bounded rationality. 
American Psychologist, 58, 697-720.  
 
Kasperson, R.E. (1992). The social amplification of risk: progress in developing an integrative 
framework. In S. Krimsky & D. Golding (Eds.), Social theories of risk (pp. 153-178). Westport, CT: 
Preager.  
 
Keil, F.C. (2006). Explanation and understanding. Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 227-254.  
 
Kempton, W., J.S. Boster, & J.A Hartley (1995). Environmental values in American culture. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
 
On the relationship between risk perception and climate proofing  
 29 
Kinchin, I.M., D.B. Hay, & A. Adams (2000). How a qualitative approach to concept map analysis can 
be used to aid learning by illustrating patterns of conceptual development. Educational Research, 42, 
43-57.  
 
Kreibich, H., A.H. Thieken, T. Petrow, M. Müller, & B. Merz (2005). Flood loss reduction of private 
households due to building precautionary measures: Lessons learned from the Elbe flood in August 
2002. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 5, 117-126.  
 
Lee, T.W. & T.R. Mitchell (1994). An alternative approach - the unfolding model of voluntary employee 
turnover. Academy of Management Review, 19, 51-89.  
 
Liberman, N., Y. Trope, S.M. McCrea, & S.J. Sherman (2007). The effect of level of construal on the 
temporal distance of activity enactment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 143-149.  
 
Liberman, N. & Y. Trope (2008). The psychology of transcending the here and now. Science, 322, 
1201-1205.  
 
Lorenzoni, I. & N.F. Pidgeon (2006). Public views on climate change: European and USA 
perspectives. Climatic Change, 77, 73-95.  
 
Lowe, T.D. & I. Lorenzoni (2007). Danger is all around: Eliciting expert perceptions for managing 
climate change through a mental models approach. Global Environmental Change, 17, 131-146.  
 
Marx, S.M., E.U. Weber, B.S. Orlove, A.A. Leiserowitz, D.H. Krantz, C. Roncoli et al. (2007). 
Communication and mental processes: Experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate 
information. Global Environmental Change, 17, 47-58.  
 
McGee, T.K. & S. Russell (2003). It's just a natural way of life… an investigation of wildfire 
preparedness in rural Australia. Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, 5, 1-
12.  
 
Miceli, R., I. Sotgiu, & M. Settanni (2008). Disaster preparedness and perception of flood risk: A study 
in an alpine valley in Italy. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28, 164-173.  
 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat & Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 
(2008). Versterken waterbewustzijn en waterbewust gedrag. Den Haag: Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, Directoraat-Generaal Water.  
 
Nisbet, M.C. (2009). Framing science: A new paradigm in public engagement. In L. Kahlor & P. Stout 
(Eds.), Understanding science: New agendas in science communication (pp. 40-67). New York: 
Taylor & Francis.  
 
Nisbett, R.E. (2003). The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently and 
why. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Robinson, J., M. Bradley P. Busby, D. Connor, A. Murray, B. Sampson et al. (2006). Climate change 
and sustainable development: Realizing the opportunity. Ambio, 35, 2-8.  
 
Rosenzweig, C., D. Karoly, M. Vicarelli, P. Neofotis, Q. Wu, G. Casassa et al. (2008). Attributing 
physical and biological impacts to anthropogenic climate change. Nature, 453, 353-357.  
 
Schein, E.H. (1996). Three cultures of management: the key to organizational learning. Sloan 
Management Review, 38, 9-20.  
 
Schön, D.A. & M. Rein (1994). Frame reflection: toward the resolution of intractable policy 
controversies. New York: Basic Books.  
 
Sjöberg, L. (2000). Factors in risk perception. Risk Analysis, 20, 1-11.  
 
Slimak, M.W. & T. Dietz (2006). Personal values, beliefs, and ecological risk perception. Risk 
Analysis, 26, 1689-1705.  
 KfC 013/10  
30 
Slovic, P. (1992). Perception of risk: Reflections on the psychometric paradigm. In S. Krimsky & D. 
Golding (Eds.), Social theories of risk (pp. 117-152). Westport, CT: Preager.  
 
Terpstra, T. & J.M. Gutteling (2008). Households' perceived responsibilities in flood risk management 
in the Netherlands. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 24, 555-565.  
 
Tjernström, E. & T. Tietenberg (2008). Do differences in attitudes explain differences in national 
climate change policies? Ecological Economics, 65, 315-324.  
 
TNS Nipo (2006). Risicoperceptie bij overstromingen in relatie tot evacuatiebereidheid. Amsterdam: 
TNS Nipo in opdracht van het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.  
 
TNS Nipo (2007). Publieksonderzoek naar risicobeleving in de regio Haaglanden. Amsterdam: TNS 
Nipo in opdracht van regio Haaglanden.  
 
Vallacher, R.R. & D.M. Wegner (1987). What do people think they're doing? Action identification and 
human behavior. Psychological Review, 94, 3-15.  
 
Vlek, C.A.J. & P.J.M. Stallen (1979). Persoonlijke beoordeling van risico's: over risico's, voordeligheid 
en aanvaardbaarheid van individuele, maatschappelijke en industriële activiteiten. Groningen: 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Instituut voor Experimentele Psychologie. 
  
Wakslak, C. & Y. Trope (2009). The effect of construal level on subjective probability estimates. 
Psychological Science, 20, 52-58.  
 
Weick, K.E. & K.M. Sutcliffe (2001). Managing the unexpected: assuring high performance in an age 
of complexity. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 
 
 
On the relationship between risk perception and climate proofing  
 31 
Appendix 1: List of persons who were consulted 
 
J. Besselink dS+V Rotterdam 
M. Heijmink  dS+V Rotterdam 
W.A. de Vries  dS+V Rotterdam 
A.P. Bakker Havenbedrijf Rotterdam 
A. Boogaard Veiligheidsregio Rotterdam Rijnmond 
J.M.A. Streng Gemeentewerken Rotterdam 
C.M. Bosscher  Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam 
R. Ammerlaan Hoogheemraadschap Delfland 
E. Hovingh Hoogheemraadschap Schieland en Krimpenerwaard 
A. Kleijburg Hoogheemraadschap Schieland en Krimpenerwaard 
E.T.G. Kelder Gemeente Dordrecht, Sector Stadsontwikkeling 
R.J. Bonte Royal Haskoning / Provincie Gelderland 
C. Paauwe Programmabureau Waterkader Haaglanden 
J. Kessels Hulpverleningsregio Haaglanden 
N.R. Landsman Provincie Zeeland 
A. Dijkstra Rijkswaterstaat Waterdienst 
I. A. van de Geer Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, DG Water 
H. van der Most Leven-met-water project PROMO, Deltares 
T. Terpstra Leven-met-water project PROMO, Universiteit Twente 
J.C.J.H. Aerts Hotspot Grote Rivieren, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
S.A. van ‘t Klooster Hotspot Grote Rivieren, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
W.J.W. Botzen Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
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Appendix 2: Report on focus group discussion (in Dutch) 
 
Verslag Groepsgesprek kennisvragen risicoperceptie KvK 
Geïnterviewden: Betrokkenen Hotspots Rotterdam en Grote Rivieren 
Datum gesprek: 9 december 2008 
 
Aanwezig: Dhr. J.C.J.H. Aerts (Grote Rivieren & IVM), dhr. R. Ammerlaan (Hh Delfland), mevr. J. 
Besselink (dS+V), dhr. R.J. Bonte (namens provincie Gelderland), mevr. C. Bosscher 
(Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam), dhr. E. Hovingh & mevr. A. Kleijburg (HH Schieland en 
Krimpenerwaard), dhr. W.A. de Vries (dS+V), dhr. J. de Boer (IVM, verslag). 
Toelichting vooraf 
Voordat de kennisvragen aan de orde komen, geeft dhr. De Boer een toelichting op het onderwerp 
risicoperceptie, die vooral is bedoeld om de verscheidenheid van mogelijk relevante aspecten naar 
voren te brengen. De kern van het begrip risicoperceptie is de mate waarin een persoon zich 
kwetsbaar voelt in verhouding tot de mate waarin hij of zij de situatie in de hand meent te hebben. 
Zoals figuur 1 (links) laat zien hangt dit af van de interpretatie van informatie en daarmee van het 
referentiekader (‘frame’) dat de persoon hanteert. Figuur 1 (rechts) laat zien dat bijvoorbeeld een 
analytisch frame tot een ander beeld leidt van zaken die bij elkaar lijken te horen (koe en kip vormen 
de categorie ‘dieren’) dan een holistisch frame (koe hoort bij het gras). Het analytisch frame is onder 
andere van belang voor het denken in termen van kansen. 
 
Performing frame
alignment
Interpretation of
incoming information
Incoming stream of 
information
Perceived
control
Perceived
vulnerability
Category Relationship
  
Figuur 1. Links: kern van het begrip risicoperceptie en de rol van het referentiekader (‘frame’) 
dat de persoon gebruikt. 
Rechts: Voorbeeld van de rol van frames bij het beantwoorden van de vraag: Welke twee 
horen bij elkaar en verschillen van de derde.  
 
Een ander relevant onderscheid is dat tussen promotiegerichte en preventiegerichte frames. Wie met 
een promotiegericht frame naar de wereld kijkt, ziet vooral positieve kansen die benut zouden moeten 
worden; wie een preventiegericht frame hanteert heeft vooral oog voor fouten die moeten worden 
vermeden. Figuur 2 demonstreert dat er in feite 4 combinaties van frames zijn die bij een onderwerp 
als klimaatverandering elk tot een ander beeld kunnen leiden. Zo toont de film van Al Gore vooral een 
holistisch en preventiegericht beeld van de wereld, waarbij het accent komt te liggen op de vraag hoe 
de mens op een moreel verantwoorde wijze met de atmosfeer zou moeten omgaan. Eveneens 
preventiegericht is het rapport van de Deltacommissie, maar dit benadrukt de wetenschappelijke 
analyse van kansen en gevolgen.  
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Promotion orientation Prevention orientation
Social progress frame
defines the issue as improving quality of 
life or harmony with nature
Middle way frame
puts the emphasis on finding a possible 
compromise position between polarized 
views 
> Plan for a tulip-shaped island
Holistic
approach
Analytical
approach
Scientific uncertainty frame
defines the issue as a matter of what is 
known versus unknown
Public accountability frame
defines the issue as responsible use or 
abuse of science in decision-making
> Report Second Deltacommittee 
Economic development frame
defines the issue as investment that 
improves competitiveness
Conflict/strategy frame
defines the issue as a game among elites, 
a battle of personalities or groups
> Climate Proof City
Morality/ethics frame
defines the issue in terms of right or 
wrong; respecting or crossing limits
Pandora’s box frame
defines the issue as a call for precaution in 
face of possible impacts or catastrophe
> Al Gore, An inconvenient truth
 
Figuur 2. De vier combinaties van frames die bij het onderwerp klimaatverandering elk tot een 
ander beeld kunnen leiden.  
 
Bij een promotiegericht, analytisch frame komt het beeld naar voren van investeren in een stad die 
‘climate proof’moet zijn en ook de competitie met andere steden aan moet kunnen. Tot slot zijn er de 
holistische plannen, zoals dat van het tulpvormige eiland, waarmee allerlei op het eerste gezicht 
tegenstrijdige wensen in één groot design kunnen worden gecombineerd.  
 
De vier cellen van figuur 2 zijn bedoeld om te laten zien dat deze frames tot heel verschillende ideeën 
kunnen leiden over wat op zeker moment het belangrijkste risico is (kwade kansen verkleinen of 
goede kansen niet missen). Het is niet zo dat het ene frame altijd beter is dan het andere; elk heeft 
sterke en zwakke punten, maar vermenging van frames leidt tot verwarring. Vaak is het wel zinvol om 
een onderwerp afwisselend vanuit het ene en het andere frame te benaderen.  
 
Het gangbare onderzoek naar risicoperceptie sluit aan bij de preventiegerichte analytische 
benadering. Aan bewoners van een gebied wordt bijvoorbeeld gevraagd naar de kans die zij denken 
te lopen om het slachtoffer te worden van diverse ongewenste voorvallen, waaronder een 
overstroming. Dit kan op diverse manieren worden uitgewerkt. In figuur 3 worden typen van 
onderzoek naar risicoperceptie onderscheiden naar methode, bron van de informatie en 
tijdsdimensie.  
 
XXXScenario
analysis
XXXProfessional 
opinions
XXPanel 
studies
XXQuasi 
experiments
XXSurveys
XXFocus 
groups
Future 
situation
Current 
situation
Outside 
observers
Citizens / 
owners
Time dimensionSource of informationMethod
 
Figuur 3. Typen van onderzoek naar risicoperceptie, onderscheiden naar methode, bron van 
de informatie en tijdsdimensie.  
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Risicoperceptie wordt vaak in relatie gezien met risicocommunicatie. Figuur 4 toont drie typen van 
communicatie over verschillende soorten beslissingen. Communicatie bij noodsituaties is van een 
hele andere orde dan communicatie om bewustwording van risico’s te bevorderen of om bewoners te 
betrekken bij het oplossen van lokale problemen. Deze onderwerpen zijn verbonden met 
verschillende schakels van de veiligheidsketen en kunnen niet zomaar in één onderzoek worden 
meegenomen.  
 
Common problem 
solving
Identifying local 
hazards
Developing 
options
Increasing trust 
and credibility in 
decision making
Managing and 
resolving conflict 
between 
stakeholders
Increasing public 
awareness and 
understanding of 
risk 
Encouraging 
personal disaster 
preparedness and 
risk reduction 
behaviour 
Providing detailed 
background 
information to all 
relevant 
organizations
Pre-warning  and 
warning of (parts 
of) the population 
to prevent or to 
mitigate damage 
Providing 
behavioural 
guidance
Where necessary, 
providing 
reassurance
Main 
communication 
goals
Involving the 
public in decisions 
on priorities for 
risk management
Developing 
facilities to inform 
the population 
about risk and risk 
management 
Providing 
information in an 
emergency 
situation
Type of risk 
communication
 
Figuur 4. Typen van risicocommunicatie, onderscheiden naar de aard van de beslissingen die 
aan de orde zijn. 
 
In aanvulling op de toelichting wijst dhr. Aerts erop dat de aanwezigen desgewenst de eigen regio als 
case kunnen inbrengen in een door hem geleide grootschalige enquête onder huishoudens. Hierin 
wordt risicoperceptie gekoppeld aan vragen over wat mensen willen, zoals investeren in 
verzekeringen en maatregelen om schade te verminderen.  
Kennisvragen 
De aanwezigen benadrukken dat de kennisvragen voor KvK een duidelijke relatie met 
klimaatverandering moeten hebben. Zij schetsen hierbij het volgende perspectief.  
 
Bewoners en gebruikers van laaggelegen gebieden zullen de komende jaren steeds weer met het 
onderwerp klimaatverandering worden geconfronteerd, bijvoorbeeld via beelden van rampen die 
ergens in de wereld plaatsvinden, rapporten van commissies, en ander nieuwsmateriaal. Daarmee 
kunnen de bewoners en gebruikers een andere voorstelling krijgen van datgene wat er in hun situatie 
zou kunnen gebeuren. Dit kan bij hen reacties oproepen waar de overheid weer op moet reageren.  
 
Daarnaast zullen in het kader van beleidsvoorbereidingen en planvorming méér gegevens 
beschikbaar komen, ook in de vorm van kaarten, over mogelijke negatieve gevolgen van 
klimaatverandering met een nadere specificatie van plaatsen waar risico’s relatief groot of klein zijn. 
Het is onvermijdelijk dat overheden over de nieuwe inzichten en getallen gaan communiceren. Dit is 
evenwel niet eenvoudig gezien de verschillende manieren waarop allerlei personen nu reeds ‘aan de 
haal gaan’ met getallen die niet kloppen. Naar verwachting zal zo’n getalsmatige benadering ook niet 
overkomen bij bewoners en gebruikers.  
 
Afgezien van specifieke situaties waar bewoners direct aan veiligheidsmaatregelen meewerken, zoals 
in de binnenstad van Dordrecht, wordt er momenteel over dit soort risico’s nauwelijks 
gecommuniceerd. Het gevolg is dat bijvoorbeeld mensen die een huis kopen dat op een waterkering 
staat of in het buitendijksgebied ligt, hierover niet worden geïnformeerd. Voorts kunnen onbedoeld 
tegenstrijdigheden ontstaan door onderwerpen waarover wel wordt gecommuniceerd: zo zou het 
propageren van de Tweede Maasvlakte als aantrekkelijke hooggelegen vestigingsplaats, op z’n minst 
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vragen kunnen oproepen bij bewoners en bedrijven in het nabije buitendijksgebied. Ook in het rapport 
van de Deltacommissie zijn tegenstrijdige boodschappen opgevallen.  
 
Het probleem van overheden is dat communicatie met burgers over deze onderwerpen noodzakelijk 
is, maar dat ze niet weten wat die communicatie zal oproepen en hoe ze die zo kunnen aanpakken 
dat 
1. mensen de risico’s beseffen en weten wat ze zo nodig zelf moeten doen, 
2. zonder dat onnodige onrust wordt gecreëerd,  
3. zonder dat onbedoelde effecten op locatiekeuzes worden veroorzaakt,  
4. maar zo dat waar mogelijk een positief investeringsklimaat wordt bevorderd.  
5. Dit is niet alleen een probleem van dit moment; het zal blijvend aandacht vergen in 
combinatie met wisselende externe omstandigheden. Daarom is ook van belang: 
6. wat de invloed is van feitelijke gebeurtenissen (New Orleans, etc.), 
7. en hoe die een wisselwerking kunnen krijgen met overheidscommunicatie.  
 
Hoewel de communicatie voor een deel een kwestie is van politieke keuzes en gevoeligheden, zou 
kennis over risicoperceptie een belangrijke bijdrage kunnen leveren aan het ontwikkelen van 
passende strategieën. Het gaat dan om kennis op vrij basaal niveau over kwesties die voortdurend in 
discussies naar voren komen, zoals de vraag of bepaalde getallen (16000 18000 kuub) nu wel of niet 
gecommuniceerd moeten worden, en waarom sommige dingen (kaartbeelden) in het buitenland wel 
kunnen en hier niet.  
 
Voorts is van belang dat discussies over communicatie zich ook kunnen uitstrekken tot de 
boodschappen die zijn af te lezen aan de inrichting van een gebied. In sommige gebieden, zoals de 
geplande nieuwbouw in de Zuidplaspolder, zullen bewoners door de fysieke omstandigheden meer 
worden geconfronteerd met de dynamiek van het water dan in andere gebieden, zoals Wateringse 
Veld. Het vermoeden bestaat dat dit tot gevolg heeft dat ze zich meer bewust zijn van de risicosituatie 
en er beter op zijn voorbereid, waardoor ze feitelijk misschien veiliger zijn dan de onvoorbereide 
bewoners van gebieden waar de kansen in theorie kleiner zijn. Dit zou nader bekeken moeten 
worden, waarbij mede de vraag rijst hoe onvoorbereide bewoners wel kunnen worden voorbereid.  
 
De kennis wordt voor de hotspots relevanter als het onderzoek wordt afgebakend in termen van 
locatiespecifieke doelgroepen of sub-hotspots, zoals: 
 binnendijks versus buitendijks, 
 bewoners versus ondernemers, 
 gevestigde bewoners/gebruikers versus nieuwkomers (nationaal, internationaal),  
 gebieden waaraan de dynamiek van water al dan niet is af te lezen.  
 
Bij het identificeren van casussen moet naar vergelijkbare fasen in de veiligheidsketen worden 
gekeken, zoals de pro-actiefase of de preparatiefase. Een punt van overweging is nog of onderzoek 
zich alleen zou moeten richten op overstromingen of ook op andere klimaatgerelateerde risico’s, zoals 
hittestress in de stad of eventuele invloeden van klimaatverandering op industriële veiligheid.  
Afspraken 
De aanwezigen willen in principe betrokken blijven bij het onderzoek. De waterschappen bekijken nog 
wie namens hen aan tafel zal zitten. Verder is er belangstelling van het Havenbedrijf, de 
Veiligheidsregio en Rijkswaterstaat. Wellicht is er ook belangstelling bij Rotterdamse 
projectontwikkelaars en wooncorporaties (actie van dhr. De Vries) en bij DG Water. 
Verzekeringsmaatschappijen zijn via dhr. Aerts in beeld.  
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